Screams for Explanation: Finetuning and Naturalness in the Foundations
  of Physics by Hossenfelder, S.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
1.
02
17
6v
2 
 [p
hy
sic
s.h
ist
-p
h]
  1
0 J
an
 20
18
Screams for Explanation:
Finetuning and Naturalness in the Foundations of Physics
S. Hossenfelder
Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies
Ruth-Moufang-Str. 1, D-60438 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Abstract
We critically analyze the rationale of arguments from finetuning and naturalness
in particle physics and cosmology. Some other numerological coincidences are also
discussed.
1 Introduction
The scientific method, so the idea, is a virtuous cycle of hypotheses-generation followed by
experimental test and subsequent evaluation. But where do hypotheses come from to begin
with?
Scientists do not randomly guess hypotheses – that would waste too much time. Instead,
much of the scientific enterprise today is dedicated not to testing hypotheses but to selecting
hypotheses worthy of test. All through their education, scientists learn to identify worth-
while research topics and then judge their own and colleagues’ work by the so-acquired
experience.
In this paper, I will analyze whether “unnaturally” small or large numbers require ex-
planation and thus whether hypotheses that explain such numbers are promising research
topics. The answer I shall offer is “sometimes.” An unnatural number requires explanation
when it is in a quantifiable sense unlikely. Unfortunately, as I will demonstrate here, most
unnatural numbers presently studied in the foundations of physics are not quantifiably un-
likely. It follows that the corresponding problems of naturalness are ill-defined and might
not be problems at all.
In the next section I classify different types of finetuning. Sections 3 and 4 briefly
summarize the “big problems” under discussion here. The reader familiar with these topics
may skip to section 5 in which I lay out the shortcomings of finetuning arguments. Section
6 is a forward-defense against frequently asked questions. Section 7 explains the relevance
of the present study. I summarize in section 8.
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2 Types of Finetuning
A good hypothesis must, most importantly, be compatible with already existing knowledge,
including both data and requirements of mathematical consistency.1 To be interesting, the
hypothesis must moreover make plausible new predictions though such predictions may be
not be amenable to test in the near future.2
In the foundations of physics – on which this paper focusses – the requirement that
a hypothesis be mathematically consistent, compatible with existing data and still make a
new prediction is difficult to fulfil. Since physics is a mature discipline, current theories
work extremely well already and are therefore hard to improve further. There isn’t even
much need for improvement, because the theories that currently constitute the foundations
of physics – the cosmological concordance model and the standard model of particle physics
- -explain the presently available data just fine.
So what is a theorist in the foundations of physics to do? A cursory scan of the literature
reveals that many of the research-efforts in theoretical high energy physics and cosmology
focus on a few “big problems.” In this paper, we will have a closer look at these problems
and investigate how problematic they really are.
We will not discuss here the history of arguments from naturalness and finetuning be-
cause this has been done before. The reader interested in the historical development is
referred to [1, 2]. A previous survey of finetuning arguments can be found in [3] and the
unnaturally small mass of the Higgs-boson in particular was discussed in [4].
2.1 Naturalness (in general)
Physicists use the word “natural” in general to mean that a theory’s dimensionless param-
eters (ie those without units) are not much larger or much smaller than 1. Since any small
number can be converted into a large number by taking its inverse, these two cases do not
have to be distinguished from each other.
Physicists usually do not quantify exactly how much larger or smaller than 1 a number
may be. The tolerance for how far away from 1 is permissible depends on any individual’s
belief that such a number may derive from an as-yet undiscovered calculation. This belief
is strongly based on experience. By experience, for example, it is not difficult to obtain
factors of about 100 from powers of 2pi that frequently appear in volume integrals.
It follows from the definition of naturalness that two numbers which are much closer
together than each number’s absolute value are also suspicious and “unnatural.” That is
because in this case the difference between the two numbers would be a small number. I
mention this example because naturalness problems in physics often originate in such small
differences.
1Here and in the following “consistency” refers to the absence of internal contradictions in a theory’s regime
of applicability. It does not imply that a theory has empirical support.
2This raises the question how much effort should be made to work out details of theories that have not yet
been tested, but this is a question which shall not concern us here.
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The belief in naturalness is usually rationalized by claiming that numbers which are
very large or very small are unlikely. They appear cherry-picked for no other reason than
correctly describing an observation and require further explanation.
2.2 Technical naturalness (in particular)
The notion of “technical naturalness” applies only to quantum field theories in particu-
lar. Technical naturalness, originally formulated by ‘t Hooft [5], is a weaker criterion than
naturalness in general because it still permits certain small numbers. A small number is
permitted if it has an explanation, typically because it is protected by a symmetry.
To understand technical naturalness, first recall that quantum field theories are energy-
dependent. At higher energies, new processes become possible, and interactions can de-
crease or increase in relevance. This means that the dimensionless numbers (“parameters”)
which appear in a quantum field theory depend on energy; the “parameters run” as the ter-
minology has it. The energy in question is determined by the type of experiment for which
one wants to make predictions and the running of parameters can be calculated using the
renormalization group equations [6].
The best known case of running parameters are the standard model’s coupling constants
which set the strengths of the three interactions. The coupling constant of the strong nuclear
force, for example, becomes smaller at higher energies, a property known as “asymptotic
freedom.” The other couplings also run with energy.
It follows that if we change the energy at which a theory is applied, the theory will trace
out a curve in an abstract “theory-space.” In this theory-space each point represents a theory
or, since the set of parameters for all possible interaction terms in the Lagrangian defines the
theory, each point is a combination of parameters respectively. The change of all possible
theories with energy is known as the “flow” in theory-space.3
To understand technical naturalness, note now that each theory at high energies is con-
nected by the renormalization group flow to a theory at low energies and vice versa. This
makes it meaningful to ask what happens with the theory at low energies if we change the
corresponding parameters of the theory at high energies because the two parameter-sets are
related by the renormalization group equations.
To digest the literature on the subject, it is helpful to know that particle physicists often
refer to high energies as “ultraviolet” (UV) and to low energies as “infrared” (IR). A theory
is then said to be technically natural if the theory in the IR does not sensitively depend on
the choice of parameters in the UV.
Phrasing naturalness in terms of a sensitive dependence on the theory at high energies
is useful because it allows physicists to quantify just how unnatural a theory is. Several
different measures for this have been introduced in the literature, but the exact definitions
are not so relevant here. For our purposes it is more relevant to understand the underlying
3In practice one does not, of course, study the space of all possible quantum field theories, but only that of
certain classes of theories, typically chosen by field-content and symmetry-requirements.
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reasoning for why these measures quantify something of interest.
High energies correspond to high resolution and hence short distances. It is therefore
basic reductionist reasoning that the theory at high energies is more fundamental. The idea
of quantifying naturalness through the sensitivity on the high-energy parameters is then
that the compatibility with what we observe at low energies should not require improba-
ble coincidences in the more fundamental theory. Because we don’t know any better, so
the argument, the parameters at high energies could really have had any values, and the
precise choice should not affect what happens at low energies where we find the standard
model. In this way, technical naturalness reflects the idea of general naturalness, that hu-
mans shouldn’t cherry-pick parameters.
A theory, then, is technically natural if getting a low-energy phenomenology that is
within measurement precision of the standard model is likely if we were to randomly pick
the parameters at high energies. This assumption is ill-defined because we don’t have a
probability distribution on parameter space, neither at low energies nor at high energies. I
explain which problems this brings in section 5. But first some more words on technical
naturalness.
I often hear technical naturalness being referred to as “the UV physics decouples.” I
have found this phrase to cause much confusion, so allow me some words of caution.
The change of parameters in the UV, which is done to quantify technical naturalness, is
not a process that is physically possible. The theory that describes our world is defined by
one particular choice of parameters. (The reader who has trouble understanding the mean-
ing of these parameters may keep in mind the example of the standard model’s coupling
constants.) At a given energy, these parameters have some specific values. We can’t change
these values because that would amount to changing the laws of nature.
The physics at high energies indeed “decouples” (for all we know) but that alone is a
not a sufficient criterion for a natural theory. That the physically possible processes at high
energies decouple at low energies means for example that to calculate the orbit of the moon
you don’t need to know what the electrons in the moon’s atoms do. Nobody knows why
that is so, but this decoupling is evidently a property of nature. Decoupling is necessary to
use effective field theory and is hence an assumption that underlies the whole framework
of the renormalization group already [7]. This means the UV physics decouples whenever
effective field theory can be used, regardless of whether or not the theory is natural.
Technical naturalness, therefore, is a criterion separate from the decoupling of short-
distance processes. It quantifies a sensitivity to a virtual (“mathematical”) change of pa-
rameters, not a sensitivity to a change that can actually happen.
Another common confusion is that naturalness is necessary for the validity of making
an expansion of the theory because the convergence of higher order contributions assumes
that the parameters in the expansion don’t unduly increase. True, but again, while this is
certainly an assumption necessary to make sense of the whole framework on which natu-
ralness builds, it is not a sufficient (or even necessary) requirement for naturalness. This
can be illustrated by the typical naturalness problems which are not so much worries about
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the overall magnitude of parameters (relevant for the expansion) but about “suspicious”
cancellations between them. (Indeed such cancellations might help a series converge.)
So why believe in naturalness? I am not sure just why naturalness has become such an
exceedingly popular criterion to decide whether or not a theory is promising. A key reason
is certainly that the masses of particles in the standard model are all technically natural,
except for the Higgs-boson [8].
There are further three commonly named historical examples in which the presence of
an unnatural number signaled that a theory had reached its limits and some new effect had
to show up beyond a certain energy. These three examples (see [2] for details) are: 1) the
mass of the electron is small compared to the contribution that stems from the self-energy
of its electric field (technically infinitely large), 2) the difference between the masses of
the two charged pions is much smaller than either one’s mass, and 3) the absence of flavor
changing neutral currents in the standard model, which signals that a constant in front of a
term enabling such processes must be small.
The first two examples were found to be naturalness problems only after the new pro-
cesses had been observed (the positron and ρ-meson, respectively). The third example lead
to the prediction of the charm quark, to my knowledge the only prediction ever made based
on a naturalness-argument [9].
On the other hand, we now know of at least three failures of naturalness: The cosmo-
logical constant, the mass of the Higgs boson, and the strong CP problem. These will be
discussed below.
(Note that the decoupling theorem [10], despite its name, does not prove technical natu-
ralness. Besides using an outdated regularization scheme it assumes perturbative renormal-
izability of the underlying theory which isn’t only a questionable assumption in general, we
know it to be not correct in the case of gravity.)
2.3 Anthropic Finetuning
Finetuning is also often used to quantify how much the parameters in our theories could be
changed so that life as we know it would still be possible. I will not discuss this case here
because it rests on an entirely different logic.
3 Finetuning In Cosmology
3.1 The Cosmological Constant Problem
The universe expands. And not only that, according to presently available data its expansion
is speeding up by the day. Trouble is, in the framework of general relativity an accelerated
expansion cannot be caused by matter or energy of any type that we know.
An accelerated expansion of the universe requires a peculiar type of “dark” energy to
get the expansion to accelerate. This energy must grow in proportion to the volume of the
5
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universe, or at least do something very similar to this. To phrase it differently, the density
of dark energy must remain constant as the universe expands.
The simplest type of dark energy is just a constant, known as the cosmological constant
and usually denoted Λ. Long believed to zero, the best current data put Λ at a small but
nonzero, positive, value.
The cosmological constant has units, so what it means for it to be small requires ex-
planation. In quantum field theory, the vacuum carries a non-zero energy-density which
derives from virtual particle contribution. For the standard model, the dominant contribu-
tion to the vacuum-energy – let us call it λ – is proportional to the fourth power of the mass
of the heaviest particle [11]. The heaviest currently known particle is the top quark, which
has a mass of about 1011eV.4 The energy-scale associated with the cosmological constant is
about 1/10 eV. The ratio between the two energies is about 10−12. The unknown origin of
this small number is the cosmological constant problem.5
However, the contribution from quantum field theory is not in and by itself observable.
In observables, this contribution always appears together with a free constant from general
relativity. Let us call this other constant (sometimes referred to as the “bare” cosmological
constant) λ′. It can be chosen by the requirement that λ+λ′ = Λ, ie that the two contribu-
tions together reproduce the measured value, Λ. This requirement follows the same logic
by which infinities in quantum field theories can be removed: By noting that the infinities
are not themselves observable and therefore it is possible to subtract another, suitably cho-
sen, infinity so that a finite term remains whose value is then determined by measurement.
The same is possible for the cosmological constant, except that here the subtracted term is
(usually assumed to be) finite.
However, since Λ (the observed value) is much smaller than λ (the contribution from
the standard model), the requirement to reproduce the observed value means that λ′ (the
bare contribution from general relativity) and λ′ must almost, but not exactly cancel. These
constants are dimensionful, hence speaking about their absolute values is meaningless. But
the statement can be rewritten without units to say that 1+λ/λ′ must be a small number.
It is here where finetuning arguments become relevant. The typical argument goes like
this: We don’t know λ, so we will assume that it could take on any value between −m4p and
m4p where mp is the Planck mass and approximately 10
29eV. If the value of the constant is
randomly chosen with uniform probability in that interval, then the probability that it will
just by chance almost cancel λ′ and leave behind λ is miniscule.
Since the cosmological constant scales with the fourth power of mass, it is highly sensi-
tive to whatever is the corresponding parameter at high energies. For this reason the above
quoted value for the vacuum energy from the standard model – which scales with the mass
of the heaviest particle–has a theoretical uncertainty that is itself estimated to scale with the
Planck mass. If there are any heavier particles that we have not yet seen, for example, these
4In units in which the speed of light and Planck’s constant are equal to 1.
5Or at least the problem we will discuss here. The literature distinguishes several cosmological constant
problems, but the other ones aren’t so relevant for what follows.
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would dominate the contribution. That’s why the problem is sometimes stated in terms of
comparing the Planck density to the (density associated with) the cosmological constant,
which results in the (more frequently quoted) 120 orders of magnitude mismatch.
However, regardless of exactly how one formulates the problem, the cosmological con-
stant is both generally and technically unnatural.
3.2 The Flatness Problem
The spacial curvature of the universe is presently very small, so small that it’s compatible
with a flat universe. The contribution of curvature to the expansion of the universe (the
Friedmann equations) however increases relative to the contribution from matter. To see
this, divide the first Friedmann equation through the square of the Hubble-rate to get a
dimensionless expression:
8pi
3m2p
(
ρr0
(aa˙)2
+
ρm0
aa˙2
)
+
Λ
3
a2
a˙2
−
k
a˙2
= 1 (1)
Here, a is the scale-factor, ρr0 and ρ
m
0 are some initial values for the density of radiation
and matter, respectively, and k is the (dimensionful) curvature parameter. Since a increases,
the cosmological constant term will eventually come to dominate. But also the contribution
from the curvature term grows faster than the contribution from both radiation and matter.
This means if the contribution from the curvature density is unobservably small today, in
the past it must have been tiny compared to the other densities. Where does its small initial
value come from? That’s the flatness problem.
Again the expectation is that “typical” numbers should be of order one, while for the
universe to be flat, one needs a factor of 10−60 or so to get today’s value to be compatible
with observation (the exact value depends on the time when initial conditions were set and
is not so relevant in the following).
The flatness problem is one of the problems that the theory of inflation – the idea that
the universe underwent a phase of exponential expansion – attempts to solve [12]. The
supposed problem can be removed by choosing a value that’s compatible with observation.
Statements about the value’s likelihood cannot be made because the probability distribution
is unknown and cannot be empirically determined because we have only one universe in the
sample.
3.3 The WIMPMiracle
Weakly interacting massive particles (WIMPs) are one of the most popular candidates for
dark matter. Their popularity derives from a numerical coincidence, which is that parti-
cles with mass nearby the electroweak scale and with a cross-section typical for the weak
interaction would be formed in the early universe with about the right abundance for dark
matter. Unfortunately the particle have not been detected. The expected cross-section has
been repeatedly revised to stay below experimental bounds, see eg [13].
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3.4 Other Finetuning Problems in Cosmology
There are a variety of other finetuning problems in cosmology which we will not discuss
here because while space and time might be infinite in general, mine in particular aren’t.
The omitted problems include: The horizon problem, the monopole problem, the coinci-
dence problem of the cosmological constant, the baryon asymmetry, and several finetuning
problems that appear in inflationary models.
4 Finetuning in Particle Physics
4.1 The Higgs Mass
The Higgs is the only fundamental scalar field. For this reason, the mass of the Higgs-boson
receives large contributions from loop corrections6 , a problem which does not occur for any
other particle. These contributions are estimated to be of the order of the energy where the
theory (in this case, the standard model) breaks down, which is close by either the Planck
mass or the energy scale where a grand unified symmetry is (believed to be) restored. This
means the contribution from the loop corrections is at least 13 orders of magnitude larger
than the actual mass of the Higgs-boson.
This problem can be remedied by subtracting the (total) contribution from all quantum
fluctuations and henceforth ignore it because it is not in and by itself an observable. That the
quantum contributions for the Higgs-boson’s mass don’t make practical trouble is evidenced
by the large number of excellent predictions which agree with measurements in spite of the
supposed problem.7
However, the introduction of a new term that almost but not exactly cancels the contri-
bution from the quantum fluctuations is thought to be fine-tuned for the same reason that
the cosmological constant is fine-tuned. If the two contributions had a typical, almost uni-
form distribution over an interval from minus the Planck mass to the Planck mass, then the
probability that they almost cancel is tiny.
The most popular solution to remedy the unnaturalness of the Higgs-boson’s mass was
supersymmetry. In supersymmetric extensions of the standard model, additional particles
appear beyond some energy scale. Supersymmetry renders the Higgs-boson’s mass natural
because it enforces a cancellation between different contributions to the mass.
However, the leading contributions to the Higgs-boson’s mass then scale with the masses
of supersymmetric partners. This means if the supersymmetric particles are heavier than the
Higgs-boson itself, then the naturalness problems return. The same happens for any other
6These corrections are often said to be due to “quantum fluctuation,” which is not wrong but sometimes
causes confusion by bringing up the question just what is fluctuating and why. Suffices to say that this is just a
word given to some terms in an equation.
7In many cases the question whether a problem really is a problem can be answered by observing what
economists refer to as “revealed preferences.” It means, in brief, look at what they do, don’t listen to what they
say. I think this criterion is of great use also in theoretical physics.
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type of new physics that comes in at some energy scale which must be beyond what we
probed so far. This is why the data delivered by the LHC has now ruled out a technically
natural explanation for the Higgs mass. Though I want to add that of course it is still possi-
ble a natural solution exists, just that it is more complicated than previously thought.
4.2 The Strong CP problem
Quantum-electrodynamics is symmetric under a CP-transformation, which is a combination
of changing the electric charge of a particle to its opposite (C) and changing the parity of
the particle (P). The weak nuclear force violates this symmetry, as we have known since the
1960s. The strong nuclear force could violate it but for unknown reasons doesn’t – at least
no such symmetry violation has been seen in any experiments.
This can be formalized by writing down a contribution to the Lagrangian that violates
the symmetry and saying that the factor in front of it – the theta-parameter, denoted θ– is
either very small or zero. Why this factor is so small is known as the “strong CP problem.”
A solution to the strong CP problem is to turn the theta-parameter into a dynamical
field that takes on a minimal value in a self-induced potential. This solution works and is
technically natural, but it was noticed quickly after its proposal that the field would be ac-
companied by a particle, the “axion” [14, 15]. The axion was looked for and experimentally
ruled out [16, 17].
In response to this, the axion models were amended so that the axion became harder to
detect. Dubbed the “invisible axion,” it has become one of the most popular candidates for
dark matter, though there is still no evidence for its existence.8
4.3 Gauge Coupling Unification
As we saw earlier, the three coupling constants of the standard model are energy-dependent.
Their energy-dependence is so that they converge towards each other. In the standard model,
however, the curves do not ultimately meet in one point. If one adds particles to the standard
model which are so heavy that we have not yet seen them, this changes the slopes of the
running of the coupling constants. Models in which the three curves meet in one point are
said to allow for “gauge coupling unification.”
Gauge coupling unification is interesting because if the three interactions of the standard
model arise from one unified theory with a symmetry that was broken at high energies, then
the gauge couplings should meet at an energy close to the breaking scale. But while this is
an appealing idea, it is neither necessary for consistency nor supported by data.
It has been known since the 1990s that if one adds supersymmetric partner particles to
the standard model, then the running gauge couplings happen to meet in one point (up to
measurement precision) [18]. This numerical coincidence has been one of the biggest moti-
8The reader be warned that what was once called “invisible axion” is now in the literature often referred to
as just “axion.”
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vators for supersymmetry. The argument is that such a meeting of curves would be unlikely
to happen by chance and is hence requires an explanation, like for example supersymmetry.
However, how well the gauge couplings meet in supersymmetric models depends on
the masses of the superpartners. Since the new data from the LHC has pushed up the lower
bounds, the superpartners – if they exist – must now be quite heavy, and this makes gauge
coupling unification worse. For this reason, some theorists now argue that additional terms
are relevant in the calculation so that gauge coupling unification can still be maintained
in supersymmetric models (presumably implying that the couplings shouldn’t have met
without these terms to begin with) [19].
5 Problems with Finetuning Arguments
5.1 Circularity
The major problem with finetuning arguments both in cosmology and in particle physics is
the reference to probabilities without defining a probability distribution, or, if a distribution
is defined, the failure to explain where the distribution itself comes from.
It is commonly – most often without stating explicitly – assumed that the probability dis-
tribution is almost uniform over an interval that (for the dimensionless parameters) stretches
from -1 to +1. A prototypical example is a normalized Gaussian of width 1 around 0, which
the reader may keep in mind as example for the following. This means one assumes a width
of order 1 to justify that a probable parameter is of order 1, which is an obviously circular
argument.
It is easy to see that the argument is circular because one could, eg, assume a proba-
bility distribution with a width of, say, 10−14, which would lead to the conclusion that the
“typical” difference between two randomly picked numbers is of order 10−14. We get out
what we put in. On that account, hence, any number is equally “natural.”
A particle physicist would likely object at this point that a probability distribution which
explicitly refers to a small number like 10−14 is itself already finetuned. But this merely
brings up the question what’s the probability of a probability distribution and so on, resulting
in an infinite regress unless some number or distribution is just postulated to be better than
all others.
If one wants to remove the problem of circularity one necessarily has to postulate a
probability distribution which brings back exactly the arbitrary choice that the criterion of
naturalness was supposed to remove. Naturalness is hence either ill-defined or meaningless.
This need to choose a probability distribution for measures of technical naturalness used
to be well-known. In 1995, Anderson and Castano, in one of the first papers to quantify
technical naturalness, clearly stated that the choice of a probability distribution “necessarily
introduces an element of arbitrariness to the construction” [20] But the issue is no longer
discussed in today’s literature.
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5.2 Occam’s Razor
A probability distribution from which to calculate the most likely choice of parameter adds
unnecessary structure to the theory and is thus in conflict with the dictum of simplicity. We
could have chosen a parameter and be done with it. The probability distribution and all the
not-observed values of the parameters are unnecessary for the derivation of any observable
and they should therefore be stripped by Occam’s razor.
Indeed, as I noted earlier, this is evident by just looking at how practitioners in the
field do their calculations. No one in their right mind would start with defining a useless
probability distribution over a space from which eventually only one value is needed.
The anthropic prediction for the cosmological constant is often named as an example
for the usefulness of probabilistic arguments [21]. This argument amounts to guessing a
probability distribution, then adding anthropic priors, and then deriving a likelihood for
our observation. It is certainly interesting that the so-obtained most likely value agrees
well with actual measurements. From an axiomatic standpoint, however, this calculation
merely replaces guessing what we observe by guessing a probability distribution for what
we observe. It’s still a guess, albeit one that can’t be ruled out because it’s probabilistic
anyway.
In recent years, arguments using Bayesian inference have become fashionable, both in
cosmology and in particle physics. Some people seem to believe that this changes anything
about the problems with naturalness, but Bayesian inference just moves the problem from
the choice of a probability distribution to the choice of priors. The priors are then assumed
to be “natural” to justify what is natural (see also section 6).
But it doesn’t matter which way one attempts to calculate probabilities, this will not put
naturalness arguments on a solid mathematical footing. The reason is that, when it comes to
the laws of nature, we don’t observe repeated events or sample over many outcomes. Any
talk about probability distributions or priors refers to the distribution of theories in some
mathematical space, almost all of which we cannot observe. We have only one set of laws
of nature.
The multiverse is the assumption that all of these unobservable theories are as real
as ours. In the case of the multiverse at least the problem of calculating probabilities is
widely acknowledged and has entered the literature under the name “measure problem.”
The attempt here is to calculate a measure9 according to which the parameters that we
observe in our universe are (ideally) the most likely ones (compatible with the existence of
life).
One can only hope that such a measure would not require more parameters than the
parameters that one can supposedly calculate with it. But even so, imagine that approach
was one day successful and someone would indeed manage to find a measure according to
which the values of parameters we observe are the most likely ones, using fewer parameters
as input. It would mean that physicists had discovered a way to calculate (some of) the
9A “measure” is what’s necessary to assign weights to the elements of a set. For all practical purposes it’s
the same as a probability distribution.
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parameters of current theories using a simpler set of parameters by searching for some opti-
mum of some function. This would be great, but all the talk about probability distributions
could be removed from this finding.
I want to emphasize that I do not say one should not pursue such thoughts. It seems
possible to me that reformulating problems in terms of probability distributions on a multi-
verse will help with finding a solution. Insights sometimes come in unexpected ways. I just
want to make clear that doing so cannot be justified on rational grounds.
5.3 No “Finetuning,” No Theory
Finetuning problems arise from an attempt to quantify the probability of some specific as-
sumptions of physical theories, that being the numeric values of dimensionless parameters.
But all our theories have many other assumptions that are chosen for the only purpose of
explaining observations.
General relativity, for example, postulates that we live in a Riemannian manifold, and
quantum mechanics postulates states are described by vectors in a Hilbert-space (or Fock
space, respectively), and the axioms of Hilbert spaces, and so on. We also postulate, for no
particular reason other than that it describes what we see that observables are real-valued,
that vacua are stable, and that infinities aren’t physical. None of these assumptions are
mathematically necessary. They’re there just because they work.
We could now start discussing what’s the probability to get any set of assumptions which
we use from out of the infinite number of mathematically consistent sets of axioms that we
could have picked. But we don’t discuss this. That’s because the purpose of science is do
describe observations and we simply pick those assumptions which are up to the task. Why
make an exception for numbers?
As an aside, this misunderstanding of the purpose of a scientific explanation is the origin
of most types of multiverses. They arise because some physicists refuse to select assumption
“just because” they describe observations.
5.4 Ambiguous Parameters (Technical Naturalness in Particular)
Any quantification of technical naturalness uses a specific set of parameters in theory-space,
which are chosen by a certain basis in the expansion of the Lagrangian. A different choice
of basis in theory-space can be used to remove naturalness problems by suitably expanding
or shrinking certain sectors of the parameters. Of course one could then complain that such
a choice of basis wouldn’t be natural, but that brings on the question which – if any – basis
is natural and what that even means.
5.5 Technical Naturalness hides Finetuning
Let us now consider that we had a probability distribution at high energies, so that we could
quantify finetuning. Even so, that the standard model without the Higgs is natural doesn’t
12
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mean that the theory at high energies is not finetuned. It means that the standard model isn’t
sensitive to whether or not the theory at high energies was finetuned.
This was not, of course, the reason why naturalness was introduced to begin with. But
in hindsight, that the masses of the standard model particles are natural besides that of the
Higgs-boson means the Higgs-boson is the only particle that allows us to decide whether or
not the underlying theory is finetuned. Such a conclusion could not have been drawn from
the other masses to begin with, hence projecting it on the Higgs boson wasn’t a rational
inference.
Let me emphasize that the argument here is not that it is wrong to think the theory at
low energies is sensitive to the parameters at high energies. This sensitivity is a property
of the theory and I do not question it. I am questioning the reason to think that this sensi-
tivity matters or, more to the point, that the absence of such sensitivity means a theory is a
promising explanation for natural phenomena.
6 Frequently Asked Questions
Q: Can we explain the preference for numbers of order one by arguing that such numbers
more commonly appear in mathematics?
A: No, in math you can find numbers of all sizes and shapes. It is true that the math-
numbers we are exposed to in school – e, γ, pi, the Feigenbaum constants, and so on –
are of order 1. But if you dig around a little you find numbers both large and small in
mathematics. A good example is the number of elements of the 16 sporadic groups
which takes on values from 8×103 to about 1054.
Q: Are you saying we should stop looking for explanations?
A: Of course not. Any better explanation is a step forward. My point is that inventing a
probability distribution to explain a parameter just adds unnecessary clutter. It doesn’t
explain anything and it’s not good scientific practice.
Q: Should finetuning arguments be discarded?
A: Finetuning arguments work fine if one knowns the probability distribution. For exam-
ple, we can make reasonable statements about how probable our galaxy or our solar
system is because we have collected statistics from other galaxies and solar systems.
The criticism of heliocentrism based on the argument that the absence of observable
parallax implied the stars had to be “unnaturally” far away was wrong for exactly
this reason: They had no probability distribution but erroneously postulated one by
assuming that the stars should be likely to have similar distances to the planets as the
planets have among each other. We now understand the distribution of stars and their
typical distances comes about dynamically during structure formation and that there
is nothing “unnatural” about the distance of our Sun to the other suns.
13
Screams for Explanation
The relevance of the example from heliocentrism is that progress was not made by
choosing the theory that “naturally” explained the absence of parallax by putting
earth in the center of the universe. Instead, the correct explanation was that the small
number was probable according to a suitable distribution.
It would be possible to treat finetuning arguments as a hypotheses, but it doesn’t
presently look as if they’re particularly well-working hypotheses.
Q: What should physicists do instead of obsessing about small numbers?
A: I’d suggest they focus on well-defined problems, or at least make an effort to come
up with well-defined problems.
Given that the standard model is technically natural except for the Higgs-mass, it
seems plausible that technical naturalness does have a rigorous mathematical basis
under certain circumstances. The question is under which circumstances.
Q: Doesn’t relying on Bayesian inference solve the problems with technical naturalness?
A: No, it doesn’t. The Bayesian approach to technical naturalness is merely a differ-
ent way to quantify the sensitivity of the low-energy parameters on the high-energy
parameters. This is a good way to avoid having to pick one particular measure for
naturalness. But I don’t question the sensitivity itself; I question it is rational to be-
lieve a theory less sensitive to high energies is more likely to be correct. The Bayesian
approach doesn’t say anything about this.
The reason that technically natural theories – like eg supersymmetry – come out ahead
in Bayesian assessment is that these theories are more rigid in a well-defined sense:
The additional symmetry (which is what makes the theory natural) favors more re-
strictive models because these models essentially have parameter-correlations built in
by way of the symmetry requirement.
These Bayesian assessments, however, do not quantify the presence of the additional
axiom which is the symmetry itself (or whatever other assumption it is that makes
a model natural). It is common practice in the literature of Bayesian assessments to
compare models with different assumptions (rather than just the same model with
different parameters), but that doesn’t mean it’s good practice. Of course if I add an
assumption – like supersymmetry – which enforces a near-cancellation of parameters,
and do not account for that assumption then this model will appear simpler and hence
preferable. But this just moves the question from what was the probability distribution
in theory-space to what were the priors of these different models to begin with. And
there is no reason to assume that a theory is more likely to be a better description of
nature just because it is more rigid.
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7 Why does it matter?
Physicists’ belief that a correct theory should be natural was the reason many of them
thought the LHC should see additional new particles besides the Higgs-boson. This has not
happened. It is also the reason why dozens of experiments were commissioned to search
for WIMPs, axions, and signals of a grand unification (like eg proton decay). We are here
looking at billions of dollars of investment.
While theoretical expectations are certainly not the only reason to commission exper-
iments – experiments are also driven by technological possibilities and experimentalists’
interest – it is without doubt one of the reasons. The focus on ill-motivated theories, there-
fore, creates a vicious cycle in which we attempt to find evidence for unpromising theories
by experiments which deliver little guidance on the development of better theories, resulting
in more fruitless theories and further experimental null-results.
To showcase the concern, allow me to quote from a recent comment in Nature by Ji Wu
and Roger Bonnet [22]. In their comment, titled “Maximize the impacts of space science,”
the two space scientists advocate that
“Agency managers should first assess options with the research community to
reach a consensus on which scientific frontiers are most likely to yield major
breakthroughs.”
Naturalness arguments have been extremely important in the foundations of physics to
quantify which ranges of parameter-space are promising to look for new phenomena. Their
failure, therefore, requires attention and a revision of method.
Moreover, the continued failure of predictions in the fields of cosmology and particle
physics erodes public trust in the foundations of physics. This is unfortunate because it is
the area of science in which we are most likely to find entirely new laws of nature – provided
we look for evidence in the right places.
8 Conclusions
I have argued here that the popularity of arguments from naturalness and finetuning in
the foundations of physics is problematic. These arguments are not mathematically well-
defined because they refer to probabilities without a probability distribution. If one attempts
to remove the problem by defining a probability distribution, this introduces an arbitrariness
which conflicts with naturalness itself, because naturalness is a criterion invented to remove
arbitrariness. If one does not specify the probability distribution (which is most often the
case), naturalness remains ill-defined. Arguments from naturalness are then merely aes-
thetic criteria with little historical evidence of being useful. I conclude that attempts to
solve ill-defined naturalness problems are a waste of time.
I will not deny that I too feel that finetuning is ugly and natural theories are more beau-
tiful. I do not, however, see any reason for why this perception should be relevant for the
discovery of more fundamental laws of nature.
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The title of this paper refers to a phrase I have heard unnaturally often, that certain
coincidences “scream for explanation.”
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